Abstract: This review article considers the place of Walter Benjamin's thought in Joseph S.
theory and practice by connecting an area of legal practice -inheritance law -with literary texts -a number of Shakespeare's plays and Milton's Paradise Lost -which orthodox understandings of legal scholarship and practice regard as non-legal. Through this connection the narrow argument about inheritance law would demonstrate the case for an interdisciplinary legal scholarship which deconstructs law's boundaries, law's habits, customs, and limits which divide texts, concepts, and phenomena into legal and non-legal materials, with only the former the legitimate concern of legal argument and scholarship. The transformation in legal thought and practice which this project promises is without doubt compatible with Benjamin's ambition to transform thought and practice but everything depends on its execution.
The book begins with this statement: 'This study investigates correlations between the will of God in the Judeo-Christian tradition and the Last Wills of humans, especially dominant males, in cultures where that tradition has developed.' 12 The book's epilogue opens with this statement:
This epilogue relates the present study to the question of the private property right, including its inheritability, in the United States. U.S. legal academics, including the colleagues with whom they tend to work -in political science, philosophy, and economics, come at this question with an interest in history, but a history of a very different kind from the one elaborated in this book. One aim of this study is to contribute to the current question of private property by appealing to a history that works with different texts (notably Shakespeare and Milton), with the aid of different historiographical methodologies. Since these are texts and methodologies most tended to by humanities academics, this study aims also to demonstrate a contribution at the inter-discipline of law-and-humanities.
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These two statements, from either end of the book, do not seem to complement one another, raising questions as to the coherence of the artifact. The first focuses on the interface between a particular religious tradition and the concept of the last will, whilst the second is concerned with 'the current question of private property', treating 'its inheritability', the apparent focus of the book's opening passage, as one aspect of that broader issue.
A further disconnect is apparent in the structure of chapter and 'inter-chapter theory signpost'. Jenkins describes the purpose of the latter as 'to give, from time to time, aerial views of this study's structure'. 14 It is difficult to understand why a series of sections which ask the reader to step back from the substantive argument and consider its structure and method are necessary. It is surely preferable for the structure to support the argument being advanced without the reader having to reflect, by reading an 'interchapter theory signpost', on the structure and method as something distinct from the argument.
Beyond this point on structure, however, is the more fundamental point that Jenkins' text, and his inter-chapter sections in particular, fail to engage in detail with the work of the thinkers it references. In the first inter-chapter section Jenkins states:
Indebted to Walter Benjamin and others, this study hypothesizes as follows: that originary moments exert -through language transmissions and related effects on or arguments 'compellingly' to the reader. 18 Jenkins' fragmented method is most clearly presented in chapter 6. He explains that the first section of that chapter 'implicitly relies on the analytical force of what I have been calling Benjaminian materialism (described in Chapter 1 as the basis of this study's methodology)'. 19 He goes on to explain that 'this study's critique of Last Will finds ample support in Agamben and Benjamin'. 20 The connections which form the mosaic, the artifact, are never presented to the reader. The mosaic, the artifact, is only referred to but referring and showing are not the same thing. Jenkins' language here is significant.
He notes that 'Benjaminian materialism' was 'described in Chapter 1 as the basis of this study's methodology', rather than asserting that Benjaminian materialism is the study's 23 and something which can be represented, is represented in the 'idea'. The 'idea' of German tragic drama can be represented but it cannot be known. 24 The purpose of such representation is 'not to carry the reader away and inspire him with enthusiasm', for 'contemplative…representation…can be counted successful only when it forces the reader to pause and reflect.' It is only by inviting the reader into the text as an 'onlooker', a co-author, working alongside you, the author, as you grapple with, assemble, constellate, and move through the material, the fragments, that the method and its alterity can be conveyed and demonstrated. By demonstrating the alterity of your method, and by performing that method in and through your text, with the reader as co-author, you are empowering the reader to assemble and constellate her own fragments as part of her own representation and, in doing so, you are deconstructing the (perceived) divide between author and reader. 26 You, as author, are offering a complete artifact to the reader, inviting the reader into that artifact in order to understand how it has been assembled, thereby empowering the reader to assemble her own artifacts and, if she wishes, disassemble yours.
Something of this trinity of representation, collaboration, and critique is captured in
Benjamin's observation that 'the more significant works, inasmuch as they are not the original and, so to speak, ideal embodiments of the genre…fall outside the limits of genre. A major work will either establish the genre of abolish it; and the perfect work will do both.' 27 Benjamin's Origin is not simply an argument for an alternative understanding of the nature of German tragic drama but, much more importantly, a representation of an alternative mode of scholarship which rejects the idea that things are simply to be known or understood. 28 It presents a mode of scholarship which represents fields of intellectual inquiry and practice as 'ideas' to be represented and re-represented through the constellation of fragments; 29 texts, phenomena, 30 'the rags, the refuse', 31 those things in the world that are excluded from established understandings or orthodoxies. This is all the more regrettable given the promising 'flash' of light in one fragment of text towards the end of the book. 34 Jenkins notes that 'theater is a particularly potent medium for the undercutting of divine right claims, since both the actor and the one who claims divine right must be concerned with projecting an appearance.' 35 Still focussing on 'divine right', he goes on to note a connection between Shakespeare's plays and 'Benjamin's claims that baroque theatre tends to perform the "dysfunction" of sovereignty, rather than a transfer from one functioning sovereignty to another'.
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Focussing on Shakespeare's Tempest, Jenkins notes that:
Prospero…aspires to pass down a law of "weak masters"…a law made by "elves"
and those who leave no footprints…This would be a law that forces nothing on those who receive it. It would be more like a poem presented for followers consideration than a Last Will enforced. The language of the pre-Shakespearian Trauerspiel has been aptly described as a 'bloody legal dialogue'…The legal analogy may reasonably be taken further and, in the sense of the mediaeval literature of litigation, one may speak of the trial as the creature whose charge against death -or whoever else was indicted in it -is only partially dealt with and is adjourned at the end of the Trauerspiel. . 41 The impact of that message on legal scholarship is still to be realised. decisive cosmic achievement. The community is assembled to witness and to judge this achievement. The spectator of tragedy is summoned, and is justified, by the tragedy itself; the Trauerspiel, in contrast, has to be understood from the point of view of the onlooker. He learns how, on the stage, a space which belongs to an inner world of feeling and bears no relationship to the cosmos, situations are compellingly presented to him.'
